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These risks could be smaller than the alternative of not striking. Unfortunately, both the privileged and unprivileged information on these matters is precarious. To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. The solid-fueled rockets, Minuteman and Polaris, promise in particular to be extremely significant components of the deterrent force. - 1969, p. 114-126 Suppose both the United States and the Soviet union had the power to destroy each others' retaliatory forces and society, given the opportunity to administer the opening blow. It is, moreover, only an average, admitting variance down as well as up. These have been financed by pitifully small budgets. And we should ask at the very least whether further expansion of this policy will buy as much retaliatory power as other ways of spending the considerable sums involved. To get past these might require large numbers of planes and missiles. Prohibited Content 3. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second. Insofar as these weapons are expensive to operate and support they are likely to displace a conventional capability that might be genuinely useful in limited engagements. There is nothing on the other hand, or very little, in the notion that dispersal in several countries makes the problem of destruction more difficult in the military sense. In case deterrence fails, they might support a counterattack which could blunt the strength of an enemy follow-up attack, and so reduce the damage done to our cities. A-World War I. B-The atomic bomb. It is a contribution to the rhetoric rather than the logic of war in the thermonuclear age. Is deterrence a necessary consequence of both sides having a nuclear delivery capability, and is all-out war nearly obsolete? (1984). The important thing would be to find some discontinuities if these steps are not to lead too smoothly to general war. This uncertainty is critical. (5) They might be used for staging bombers on the way to as well as from the target. Balance of Power accepts resort to war as a means, balance of terror accepts only the threat of war or threat of nuclear weapons as a means for securing the balance. When more than one country is involved, the joint decision is harder still, since there is opportunity to disagree about the ambiguity of the evidence, as well as to make separate considerations of national interest. Here, Polaris, the combat air patrol of B-52's, and in fact all of the mobile platforms -- under water, on the surface, in the air and above the air — have severe problems. Full and comprehensive Nuclear Disarmament and global agreement on arms control must be secured for finally ending the balance of terror in international relations. In this respect the ready optimism on the subject reflects the basic confusion, referred to at the beginning of this essay, as to the nature of the technological race. This belief, frequently expressed by references to Mr. Oppenheimer's simile of the two scorpions in a bottle, is perhaps the prevalent one. The decision to station the Thor and Jupiter missiles overseas has been our principal public response to the Russian advances in rocketry, and perhaps our most plausible response. But this is related also to a fourth problem, namely that of active defense. The accident problem, which has occupied an increasingly prominent place in newspaper headlines during the past year, is a serious one. But how important is it that the majority of the U.S. force of strategic vehicles be able to surmount this obstacle? The nature of the fail-safe precaution was also described. The inaccuracy of the IRBM requires high-yield warheads, and such a combination of inaccuracy and high yield, while quite appropriate and adequate against unprotected targets in a general war, would scarcely come within even the most lax, in fact reckless, definition of limited war. Though they were not in themselves likely to trigger misunderstanding, the B-47 accidents this year at Sidi Slimane and at Florence, South Carolina, and the recent Nike explosion (of which an Army officer in the local command said, "A disaster which could not happen did.") A protected power to strike back does not come automatically, but it can hardly be stressed too much that it is worth the effort. But in any case, strategic missiles will be in the minority. The basis for the hopeful impression that they will not is rather vague, including a mixture of hypothetical properties of ballistic missiles in which perhaps the dominant element is their supposed much more rapid, "push-button" response. In this case, the situation would be something like the old-fashioned Western gun duel. Strategic deterrence has other inadequacies besides its limitations in connection with limited war. Mr. Kennan refers to American concern about surprise attack as simply obsessive,[2] and many people have drawn the consequence of the stalemate as has Blackett, who states: "If it is in fact true, as most current opinion holds, that strategic air power has abolished global war, then an urgent problem for the West is to assess how little effort must be put into it to keep global war abolished. Both accept military power as a means for maintaining the balance. For example, the estimated cost of one missile increased by a factor of over 50 — from about $35,000 in 1949 to some $2 million in 1957. In this way, no single state should be able to dominate the others. Introduction. It is quite erroneous to suppose that by contrast with manned bombers the first IRBMs can be launched almost as simply as pressing a button. As a result, competent people have been led into critical error in evaluating the prospects for deterrence. Balance of Power accepts resort to war as a means, balance of terror accepts only the threat of war or threat of nuclear weapons as a means for securing the balance. It seemed only to complete the preponderance of American power provided by our enormous industrial mobilization base and to dispense with the need to keep it mobilized. Is mutual extinction the only outcome of a general war? But an unsentimental appraisal suggests no sudden change in prospect and in particular no easy removal of the basic East-West antagonisms. The state-of-the-art during the past decade or so has been such that this has meant a drastic rise in costs at distances less than those from bases well within the United States to targets well within Russia. "Extinction" is a state that badly needs analysis. (6) They might support one or two such "turn-arounds." Unlike JP-4, the fuel used in jet bombers, liquid oxygen cannot be held for long periods of time in these vehicles. It imposes some dangers of its own. A fail-safe procedure extends the period for final commitment. Let me suggest at this point the inadequacy of the popular conception of the airborne alert — an extreme form of defense by mobility. Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, Autonomous Vehicles and the Future of Auto Insurance, Command and Control in U.S. An aggressor must constantly weigh the dangers of all-out attack against the dangers of waiting, of not striking "all-out." The unvaryingly immoderate claims for each new weapons system should make us wary of the latest "technological breakthroughs." We can talk with comparative confidence here, because the U.S. strategic force is itself largely determined for this period. And if the press reports are correct, the installations planned do not contemplate bomb-resistant shelters. 1. In this period some U.S. bombers will be able to reach some targets from some U.S. bases within the original forty-eight states without landing on the way back. The estimate of 50 million deaths in the Second World War includes some 20 million Soviet citizens and an estimated six million Jews and two to three million others killed in Nazi concentration camps. It would be a great mistake to dismiss the recent Soviet charges on this subject as simply part of the war of nerves. Most hopefully, it is sometimes assumed that such attacks will be preceded by days of visible preparations for moving ground troops. The end of cold war and the emergence of process of close economic cooperation between East and West, have given rise to a positive qualitative change in contemporary international relations. Five and six, which involve exposure intermittently only, and after the start of war, are less vulnerable but nonetheless problematic. The interdependencies of limited and total war decisions make it clear that the development of any powerful limited war capability, and in particular a nuclear one, only underlines the need, at the same time, for insuring retaliation against all-out attack. In closing these remarks on the special problems of overseas bases, it should be observed that I have dealt with only one of the functions of these bases: their use as a support for the strategic deterrent force. The simplified (and popularized) easy deterrence narrative is a pas- The slender basis for Western optimism is displayed not only in the writings of journalists but in the more analytic writings of professionals. Moreover, to achieve deterrent balance will entail some new risks requiring insurance — in any case, some foreign policy reorientation. He overestimates the number of such bases by more than a factor of ten,[5] and in any case, missile firings on the scale of a thousand or more involve costs that are by no means out of proportion, given the strategic budgets of the great powers. The increased readiness of strategic forces affects the disarmament issues and therefore our allies and the neutral powers. One of the most disturbing features of current opinion is the underestimation of this difficulty. This article identifies a consistent approach to stability across a wide range of conflict situations at the heart of Thomas Schelling's strategic theory. none, 1958. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html. Content Filtrations 6. Political realism, as opposed to idealism, is mistakenly sometimes believed to be a theory that flourished during the modern times. Copyright 10. On the other hand, this does not mean that we can dispense with the defense of cities. This has meant confusing deterrence with matching or exceeding the enemy's ability to strike first. In a clear sense the great multiplication and spread of nuclear arms throughout the world, the drastic increase in the degree of readiness of these weapons, and the decrease in the time available for the decision on their use must inevitably raise the risk of accident. C-Intervention in the Third World. Their importance here is both more considerable and likely to be more lasting than their increasingly restricted utility to deter attack on the United States. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review. The first hurdle to be surmounted is the attainment of a stable, steady-state peacetime operation. 2. After Trek: Choose Your Pain (2017) (TV Episode) Mark Lenard 's roles in TOS are mentioned in the trivia part of the show. [Ship's Chapel] SCOTT: The ceremony will be carried on all viewing screens, sir. But as the sole or principal defense of our offensive force, dispersal has only a brief useful life and can be justified financially only up to a point. Candidate, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Assistant Policy Researcher, RAND; Ph.D. Student, Pardee RAND Graduate School. Privacy Policy 8. Mere membership in the nuclear club might carry with it prestige, as the applicants and nominees expect, but it will be rather expensive, and in time it will be clear that it does not necessarily confer any of the expected privileges enjoyed by the two charter members. The emphasis of the advocates of limitation has been on the high rather than on the low end of the spectrum of weapons. B.H. And the coordination problem referred to is very widely misunderstood. This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. Such a procedure requires that bombers, flushed by some serious yet not unambiguous warning, return to base unless they are specifically directed to continue forward. Such a situation is clearly extremely unstable. The impression is rather widespread that one-third of the SAC bombers are in the air and ready for combat at all times. It remains to examine the view that the provision of these weapons will broaden the range of response open to our allies. The bombers will continue to make up the predominant part of our force in the early 1960's. The fact that we may not know the accuracy and number of his missiles will not deter him. But these are all years away. D-The Balance of Power. In fact, there is a very unpleasant interaction. It remains to be seen whether there are any equilibrium points between the use of conventional and all-out weapons. He stated: But unfortunately his evaluation of the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles against bomber bases shows that it was not at all safe to "disregard this possibility." In this respect such missiles will be less ready than alert bombers. Although there are many variations of balance of power theory and interpretations of the concept, all are premised on the minimum of a tendency and the maximum of a lawlike recurrent equilibrium model. My comments will take the form of a swift run-through of the characteristic advantages and disadvantages of various strategic systems at each of the six successive hurdles mentioned earlier. On the other hand, if it is clear that the aggressor too will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of his aggression, he then has strong reason not to attack, even though he can administer great damage. Insofar as this view rests on the belief that the intermediate range ballistic missile is adapted to limited war, it is wide of the mark. Second, the recent acceleration of production of our intermediate range ballistic missiles and the negotiation of agreements with various NATO powers for their basing and operation have given our overseas bases a renewed importance in deterring attack on the United States — or so it would appear at first blush. Whether or not thousands are needed depends on the yield and the accuracy of the enemy missiles, something about which it would be a great mistake for us to display confidence. Some increase in the number of armed bombers aloft is to be expected. We are not distributing a generic "modern" weapon with all the virtues of flexibility for use in a wide range of attacks and invulnerability in all-out war. However, most of the bombers in the early Sixties will require some sort of touch down of the bomber or the tanker or both on the way back to the United States after fulfilling their mission. Using some portion of our force not in retaliation but to spoil the follow-up raid by killing or at least disrupting the matching of bombers with tankers, bombers with bombers, bombers with decoys, and bombers with missiles could reduce both the number of attackers reaching our defenses and the effectiveness of their formation for getting through. In neither world war, then, did the United States enter for considerations of the balance of power. It is held by a very eminent and diverse group of people -- in England by Sir Winston Churchill, P. M. S. Blackett, Sir John Slessor, Admiral Buzzard and many others, in France by such figures as Raymond Aron, General Gallois and General Gazin, in this country by the titular heads of both parties as well as almost all writers on military and foreign affairs, by both Henry Kissinger and his critic, James E. King, and by George Kennan as well as Mr. Acheson. These missiles are launched vertically and, so to speak, do not care in which direction they are told to proceed — their times on trajectory are eminently calculable and, allowing a cushion for failures and delays, times of firing can be arranged for near-simultaneous impact on many dispersed points, on Okinawa and the United Kingdom as well as on California and Ohio. Any extensive increase in the armed air alert will increase the hazard of accident and intensify the concern already expressed among our allies. In this case the first wave might be smaller and less well organized than in a carefully prepared attack. And it might not be easy for the enemy to discern their purpose. A tremendous weight of weapons could be delivered in spite of it. Although it is quite hopeless to look for an inspection scheme which would permit abandonment of the deterrent, this does not mean that some partial agreement on inspection and limitation might not help to reduce the chance of any sizable surprise attack. The proponents do not seem to regard an addition of capability for NATO at the all-out end of the spectrum as the required broadening; but if they do, they are faced with the question previously considered: the actuality of this all-out response under all-out attack. It is by no means certain that we shall meet the test. It is a contribution to the rhetoric rather than the logic of war in the thermonuclear age. This is of particular interest to our allies who do not have quite the same freedom to choose between basing at intercontinental and point-blank range. Significantly, "Terror" begins with Kirk officiating over a wedding between two crew-members, which … After making allowance for the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile, this means a ratio of some ten for one or better. Or getting through may involve carrying heavy loads of radar decoys, electronic jammers and other aids to defense penetration. I must confess that the picture of the world that I have presented is unpleasant. Directed by Vincent McEveety. Short of some hard-to-manage peaceful elimination of the basic antagonisms, or a vast and successful program of disarmament, it would be irresponsible to surrender the deterrent. It is conceivable that we might attempt the intercontinental delivery of iron bombs as well as ground troops and ground-support elements. Second — the preparation and launching time. 209-222 Back to list Add to My Bookmarks Export citation How much the Soviets will risk in surprise attack will depend in part on the vulnerability of our future posture. Though deterrence is not enough in itself, it is vital. Report a Violation, Balance of Terror and Nuclear Deterrence of a State, International Politics and Domestic Politics (Similarities and Dissimilarities), Impact of Nuclear Weapons on International Relations. First, since thermonuclear weapons give an enormous advantage to the aggressor, it takes great ingenuity and realism at any given level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilibrium. However the balance of terror continued to have a doubtful validity both in the sphere of maintenance of peace and the regulation of the behaviour of states. It runs counter, that is, to our wishes. (7) At the other extreme, they might support continuous operation up to the outbreak of the war. The Balance of Terror Theory: A Comparative Analysis By Terrance Jones Even if one accepts the balance –of-terror theory, including the belief that there are almost no circumstances in which the Soviets would launch a deliberate attack on the continental United States (and vice versa), some important strategic problems remain. Moreover, when one considers the many hundreds of vehicles involved, the cumulative probability of accidental war would rapidly approach certainty with repeated false alarms. The argument runs that the offense requires concentration and so the aggressor necessarily provides the defender with a lucrative atomic target. The balance of threat (BoT) theory was proposed by Stephen M. Walt first in his article Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, published in the journal International Security in 1985. He confers with one of his officers (the centurio… But none of the new developments in vehicles is likely to do that. Our allies were fearful that the Soviet ballistic missiles might mean that we were no longer able or willing to retaliate against the Soviet Union in case of an attack on them. Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks. Ironically, according to reports of Soviet tactical exercises described in the last few years in the military newspaper, The Red Star, atomic weapons are in general employed only by the offense, the defender apparently employing Soviet-preferred Western strategies. Accordingly the missiles benefited in particular. The many critics of the massive retaliation policy who advocate a capability to meet limited aggression with a limited response are on firm ground in suggesting that a massive response on such an occasion would be unlikely and the threat to use it therefore not believed. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. The existence of such a force might be a considerable provocation and in fact a dangerous one in the sense that it would place a great burden on the deterrent force which more than ever would have to guarantee extreme risks to the attacker — worse than the risks of waiting in the face of this danger. Deterrence is not dispensable. They have a variety of military, political and economic roles which are beyond the scope of this paper. (ed. In fact it would be appropriate to say something about the limitations as well as the necessity of strategic deterrence in this as well as other connections. Most obviously "the abolition of the weapons necessary in a general or 'unlimited' war" would offer the most insuperable obstacles to an inspection plan since the violator could gain an overwhelming advantage from the concealment of even a few weapons. When nations possess massive destructive weaponry then they are deterred from attacking each other not by the likelihood of effective defence, but by the probability of their own destruction. Western forces at the end of the war were larger than those of the Soviet Union and its satellites. But because the balance of terror is supposed, almost universally, to assure us that all-out war will not occur, advocates of graduated deterrence have proposed to fix the limits of limited conflict in ways which neglect this danger. Returning from target protection of the popular balance of Terror have several similarities well... Quick response and a high degree of readiness in the air and ready for combat at all would be. 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Energies and efforts if they could not retaliate, would have a of! Operation up to the basic East-West antagonisms in mind gradualness of the of.

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